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Summary: Trials have evolved into an adversarial process, and the state has taken
over the prosecutorial function. There are five challenges to this ‘equality of arms’:
expanded powers of the state to address a perceived imbalance between prosecution
and defence; emergency provisions becoming part of normal law; the application of
criminal law to deal with regulatory issues; the use of civil jurisdiction as a crime
prevention strategy; and the accommodation of victims and witnesses within the
system. Maintaining a balance between security and public protection on the one
hand and strong due process safeguards on the other is a complex task. But keeping
both perspectives in mind helps ensure that new measures are driven by evidence-
based criteria and broad considerations of strategy.
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Introduction
Many commentators believe that change is taking place in the criminal
justice system. For the most part, however, such analyses focus on the
back end of the system: on prison expansionism, on the decivilising of
punishment, on the rise of a risk culture, on the increasing use of civil
sanctions, on restrictions on judicial discretion, and on the steady loss of
the humanism and social work expertise. In this article,1 we wish to focus
on the front end of the system, to demonstrate the variety of ways in
which the modern due process model of justice is increasingly being
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reconfigured. The article will commence by explaining what is meant by
the modern due process model of justice, setting out in particular how
the ‘equality of arms’ framework between the state and the accused was
created, before going on to document the various ways in which this
model is being reshaped.
How would we define the modern due process model of justice?
In very general terms, it can be said that an exculpatory model of justice
existed prior to the nineteenth century. Under such a model ‘the
paradigm of prosecution’ was the victim (Hay 1983, p. 165). He or she
was the key decision-maker and the principal investigator. It was the
victim’s energy that carried the case through the various prosecution
stages.Victims, for example, engaged in fact-finding, gathered witnesses,
prepared cases, presented evidence in examination in chief and bore the
costs involved. Guilt was determined by a much looser conception of
culpability than the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ formula which we
understand today. It was, for the most part, premised on moral
blameworthiness and local knowledge about the nature of the accused.
At trial, those accused of crime were ordinarily not entitled to have
arguments made for them by legal counsel on the basis that ‘it requires
no manner of skill to make a plain and honest defence’. Furthermore,
there was no explicit presumption of innocence. In ‘accused speaks’
trials, as they were referred to, the accused was always under an
obligation of self-exculpation (Langbein 1983). At the end of the
prosecution case, the trial judge would turn to the accused and ask how
he wished to respond to the evidence. The inference was clear. If the
accused had nothing to say in his defence, then he was more likely than
not to be guilty (Beattie 1986).
In the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however,
the trial gradually evolved from an ‘expressive theatre’ that sought
discovery of the truth via an accused speaks forum to a more reflective,
categorised process that sought determination of justice through testing
the prosecution’s case (Langbein 2003). A logic of adversarialism slowly
unfolded, which had a number of important consequences. The beyond
reasonable doubt standard of proof, for example, crystallised into a legal
formula and it became a maxim of law that it was better that ten guilty
men should go free than to punish one innocent man. Facilitated by the
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‘lawyerisation’ of the trial process, exclusionary rules of evidence were
also formulated as rules of law. These acted as filtering devices 
that examined the prosecution case through the lens of its possible
prejudicial effect on the accused. They included, inter alia, the
inadmissibility of hearsay evidence; closer scrutiny of the voluntariness
and fairness of confessions; corroboration warnings in respect of
accomplice witnesses; more rigorous examination of the competence of
certain prosecution witnesses; and the exclusion of bad character
evidence against the accused as proof of his propensity to commit the
crime in question. The accused was gradually freed from the burden of
exculpation.
The state also, over the course of the nineteenth century, began 
to monopolise the prosecutorial function. The local victim justice 
system thus increasingly yielded to a criminal justice system as an
‘equality of arms framework’ was created between the state and the
accused. This was all consistent with the emergence of a rule of law
society in which executive arbitrariness and discretionary power abuses
were constrained, egalitarianism was advocated and procedural justice
was promoted in addition to substantive justice.Today, we would suggest
that this equality of arms framework is being challenged in five related
areas.
The ‘tooling up’ of the state
Many commentators would claim that the system is now over-protective
of those accused of crime, at the expense of justice. For example, on 8
December 2003, the President of the Association of Garda Sergeants and
Inspectors suggested that:
… the overwhelming feeling of members is that the criminal justice
system has swung off balance to such an extent that the rules are now
heavily weighted in favour of the criminal, murderer, drug trafficker,
and habitual offender. At the same time, the system is oppressive on
the victims of crime, the witness who comes to the defence of the
victim and the juror whose role it is to ensure justice is done and seen
to be done. Much of the blame can be laid at the door of the system.
The State has an equal duty of care to the victim, witness and juror as
to the accused.
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Similarly, James Hamilton, Director of Public Prosecutions, noted that
Ireland’s laws are heavily weighted against the prosecution: ‘I sometimes
feel that the criminal law in Ireland can be like a game of football with
very peculiar rules. The prosecution can score as many goals as they like
but the game goes on. As soon as the defence scores a goal the game is
over and the defence is declared the winner’ (The Irish Times, 14 May
2006).
A ‘tooling up’ of the state is evident in the increased powers of search
and seizure for the Garda Síochána. For example, gardaí are increasingly
permitted to issue their own search warrants in ‘circumstances of
urgency’.This more self-substantiating process circumvents the need for
judges or peace commissioners to be independently satisfied that reason-
able grounds exist for the crossing of thresholds.2 It is also evident in:
• The enactment of the so-called ‘hot pursuit’ provision, which enables
gardaí to enter into private property without a warrant when pursuing
a suspected offender.3
• The introduction of far-reaching powers under the Criminal Justice
Act 1994 in relation to drug trafficking and money laundering that
provide for the issuance of access orders and search warrants against
innocent third parties, such as financial advisers and solicitors.4
• Increased Garda powers of detention without charge.5
• The inroads that have been made into the right to silence.
• Restrictions on the right to bail.
• A downwards pressure on the standard of proof.6
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The normalisation of extraordinary law7
A second way in which the equality of arms framework is being
undermined is through the gradual normalisation of extraordinary
measures into the ordinary criminal justice system. Following the War of
Independence and the Civil War in the early 1920s, a law-bound
democratic polity began to emerge in Ireland. Democracy itself, however,
continued to be blighted in the ensuing two decades by a residual
militant republicanism that manifested itself in the form of the Irish
Republican Army (IRA).The fledgling Irish state responded with a series
of draconian emergency laws and tactics that enjoyed a ‘high degree of
public tolerance’ (O’Halpin 1999, p. 201). These included the
introduction of military tribunals with the power to dispense justice for
capital crimes, restrictions on the right to appeal the decisions of such
tribunals, internment powers without trial, intrusive political
surveillance, the proscription of certain organisations, the power to
proclaim meetings and increased powers of search and seizure (Hogan
and Walker 1989).
A new Constitution came into force following its approval by a
referendum in July 1937. The history of paramilitarism in Ireland,
however, ensured that provision was also made for the security menace
still posed to the state. The establishment of special non-jury courts
(under Article 38.3), whose powers, composition, jurisdiction and
procedures were to be established by legislation, and provisions in
respect of treason (under Article 39) all signpost the contingencies that
were still being made to protect state security from subversive activity.
More broadly, Article 28.3.3 also gave constitutional immunity to any
law which was ‘expressed to be for the preservation of public safety of the
state in time of war or armed rebellion’. Once a declaration of emergency
was made by both Houses of the Oireachtas, constitutional rights and
safeguards could be abridged.
More permanently, and following renewed IRA activity in the late
1930s in Ireland and Britain, the Offences Against the State Act 1939
was introduced.The Act and its subsequent amendments, particularly in
1972 and 1998, are open to constitutional challenge.The 1939 Act forms
the principal pillar in Ireland’s permanent quest to protect state security.
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The first four parts of the Act are permanently in force. On the other
hand, Part V, which makes provision for the establishment of the Special
Criminal Court and the power of the government to schedule offences,
only comes into operation when the government makes the appropriate
proclamation that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the
effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace
and order. In making such proclamations under Part V, the government
does not have to explain to the Dáil why such draconian measures are
deemed necessary. The necessary proclamations under Part V of the
1939 Act have been made for the periods 1939 to 1946, 1961 to 1962
and 1972 to date. The current proclamation can be annulled only by a
resolution of the Dáil or when the government issues a proclamation
declaring that Part V is no longer in force (Kilcommins and Vaughan
2004).
The enactment of the 1939 Offences Against the State Act must be
seen in a context in which it was thought that democracy in Ireland was
extremely fragile and in need of extraordinary powers to sustain it against
the ‘enemy within’ who sought to subvert the state. This meant that
Ireland placed a degree of reliance on extraordinary legislation to counter
the specific threat posed. What is striking about this extraordinary
legislation, however, is that it has proved remarkably malleable in
adjusting to more normal circumstances. Despite the signing of the Good
Friday Agreement in 1998, which is dependent on the maintenance of
paramilitary ceasefires and decommissioning, and which ‘looks forward
to a normalisation of security arrangements and practices’, the Irish
government has demonstrated no willingness to remove such
extraordinary laws. Indeed they have come to be seen as an efficient
means of investigating and prosecuting serious, though ordinary, crimes
(Kilcommins and Vaughan 2004; Hillyard 1987). This has occurred in a
variety of fields.
Evidence of this normalisation process is discernible in the wide use of
the extraordinary powers of arrest and detention – so as to encompass
some serious, though non-paramilitary, activities – permitted under
Section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939.8 Further evidence
of this normalisation process can be gleaned from the continued
retention of the non-jury Special Criminal Court.The re-introduction of
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the court in 1972, at the height of ‘the Troubles in Northern Ireland’,9
was justified on the basis that juries were likely to be intimidated by
paramilitaries. It continues to be employed today despite little in the way
of a risk assessment as to whether there is a possibility of continued
paramilitary intimidation.10 Moreover, the Special Criminal Court is
increasingly being employed to try cases that have no paramilitary
connection. Indeed, far from being disbanded on the basis of the notable
downturn in paramilitary activity, the Irish government has announced
that a second such court will be established to expedite trials. The
establishment of this second court will, according to a government press
release, ‘serve to demonstrate the State’s resolve to seriously deal with
any activity which is a threat to the State and its people’. The once
emboldening claim that one has a right to a jury trial in Ireland, as
provided for under Article 38.5 of the 1937 Constitution, seems much
more fragile, and somewhat quixotic, in the light of such developments.
Criminalising the corporations
When we think about criminal law we tend to think only in terms of
homicides, assaults, sexual offences, the requirements of mens rea and
actus reus and the general defences.This is a mistake because criminal law
is increasingly being employed to contend with regulatory issues. There
are, for example, now over 400 company law offences on the criminal
calendar. This growth in the administration of regulatory crime has two
important consequences for the purposes of this article: the
fragmentation of the prosecutorial function and further restrictions on
due process rights (Braithwaite 2000).
Throughout the nineteenth century, the state very gradually began to
monopolise the prosecutorial function as the view emerged that the
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security of society could not be left at the whim of individual victims.
Violence and justice were now to a greater extent monopolised by the
central authorities through the medium of the Office of the Director of
Public Prosecutions. Conflicts were no longer viewed as the property of
the parties most directly affected. Previously strong stakeholder interests
such as victims and the local community were gradually colonised in the
course of the nineteenth century by a state apparatus which acted for
rather than with the public. The local victim justice system thus
increasingly yielded to a Leviathan criminal justice system that was
governed by a new set of commitments, priorities and policy choices.
Centrally organised schemes of prosecution, for example, were
operated in Ireland since 1801 and by the mid-nineteenth century
sessional crown solicitors were appointed in each of the counties.11 In
England, a statute passed in 1879 created the Office of the Director of
Public Prosecutions, thus facilitating the gradual emasculation of the
victim’s previously pivotal role in initiating and carrying on criminal
proceedings. By now, the duties of investigation, prosecution, sentencing
and punishment – all of which had previously been premised to a large
degree on popular participation – had become more privatised, focused
and discreet state-accused events.
Today the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is, to
some extent, beginning to lose its monopoly role vis-à-vis particular types
of regulatory crime. The number of agencies with the power to
investigate crimes in specific areas and to prosecute summarily has
increased dramatically in recent years and now includes the Revenue
Commissioners, Competition Authority, Environmental Protection
Agency, Health and Safety Authority and the Office of the Director of
Corporate Enforcement.
In terms of the focus of this article, there are two interesting
characteristics about the current use of these regulatory strategies in
Ireland. First, the emergence of this regulatory criminal framework is
significantly different from the unified monopolies of centralised control
underpinning policing and prosecution in the modern state. Arguably
these new techniques and strategies can be seen as part of a pattern of
more (rather than less) governance, but taking ‘decentred’, ‘at-a-
distance’ forms. This enlargement in scope, however, is fragmented in
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nature, occupying diverse sites and modes of operation. Despite
extensive powers to share information, there is no unifying strategy
across the agencies or with other law enforcement institutions such as the
DPP or Garda Síochána. Staffing levels, resources, workloads and
working practices vary from agency to agency. Indeed, and apart from
respective annual reports, there is little in the way of an accountability
structure overseeing the policy choices of the various regulatory agencies,
the manner in which they invoke their considerable investigative and
enforcement powers or the way in which information is shared between
them and the Garda Síochána.
Second, many aspects of regulatory crime operate in opposition to the
general trend of paradigmatic criminal law, which permits general
defences, demands both a conduct element and a fault element and
respects procedural standards such as a legal burden of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Pure doctrines of subjective culpability and the
presumption of innocence are increasingly abandoned within this
streamlined regulatory framework. It remains a matter of speculation the
extent to which the instrumental mentality underpinning much of the
regulatory framework will seep into paradigmatic criminal law and be
employed to undermine further the doctrinal reasoning that supports
many of the due process protections operating in that domain. But we
should certainly remain alive to the possibility of the normalisation of
some of the more repressive, consequentialist aspects of this regulatory
framework into the ordinary criminal justice system.
Employing the civil realm
What also appears to be emerging in recent years is the increasing
adoption of a more variegated approach to the detection, investigation
and punishment of offences. In particular the state has begun to use the
civil jurisdiction as a crime prevention strategy. This can clearly be seen
in relation to the enactment of measures by which the proceeds of crime
can be confiscated or taxed.12 The Proceeds of Crime Bill was mooted in
Ireland in 1996 to combat the dangers posed to society by drug-related
crime. Its cardinal feature permits the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) to
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secure interim and interlocutory orders against a person’s property,
provided that it can demonstrate that the specified property – which has
a value in excess of €13,000 – constitutes, directly or indirectly, the
proceeds of crime. If the interlocutory order survives in force for a period
of seven years,13 an application for disposal can then be made. This
extinguishes all rights in the property that the respondent party may have
had (Kilcommins et al. 2004). CAB also has a power to ensure that the
proceeds of criminal activity are subjected to taxation (Considine and
Kilcommins 2006).14
The speed with which the legislation was introduced is a cause of
concern, not least because of the manner in which it seeks to circumvent
criminal procedural safeguards guaranteed under Article 38 of the
Constitution. In particular, the legislation authorises the confiscation of
property in the absence of a criminal conviction; permits the
introduction of hearsay evidence; lowers the threshold of proof to the
balance of probabilities; and requires a party against whom an order is
made to produce evidence in relation to his or her property and income
to rebut the suggestion that the property constitutes the proceeds of
crime (McCutcheon and Walsh 1999). This practice of pursuing the
criminal money trail through the civil jurisdiction – thereby immunising
the state from the strictures of criminal due process embodied in the
Irish Constitution – raises all sorts of civil liberty concerns about hearsay
evidence, the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. It is
difficult to dislodge the perception that such a device permits the Irish
state to achieve late-modern criminal justice goals – public protection,
crime control and threat neutralisation – in a civil setting.
Moreover, measures such as the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 might
best be described as falling under a schema of criminal administration, a
cost-efficient form of legitimate coercion which jettisons the orthodox
safeguards of criminal law (the requirements of criminal guilt, proof
beyond reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence) in the
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‘public interest’. In addition to the absence of safeguards, this schema
also, however, displays another important difference from the traditional
criminal law. Injunctions that seize or tax assets thought to be the
proceeds of crime are not designed to reorientate human behaviour or to
reintegrate those that are deviant. Instead their focus is more ‘apersonal’
in nature and seeks to move the law away from the ‘barren aim of
punishing human beings’ to the fruitful one of threat neutralisation.
Legal pluralism
The modern criminal justice system has excluded the voices of many
stakeholders in its attempt to set up this equality of arms framework
between the state and those accused of crime. It has, for example, often
overemphasised the importance of the collective (‘the social’) and made
categorical exclusionary assumptions about victims and witnesses which
may be seen as part of the more generalising or totalising tendencies of
modernity. Increasingly, however, the system is having to recognise that
it operates within a complex matrix of competing tensions and that it
cannot set itself up solely in terms of a contest between the state and the
accused.
More accommodation of victims and witnesses has become necessary
and this obviously has implications for the equality of arms framework.
For example, in recent years the victims of crime have become much
more prominent actors in the theatres of prosecution and sentencing.
This has ensured a more responsive support structure in the aftermath of
crimes, more empathetic treatment by criminal justice agencies in the
detention and prosecution of crimes and a more conducive courtroom
environment regarding the provision of information on crimes.
Upgrading the status of the victim from ‘nonentity’ to ‘thing’ is of course
a laudable and necessary tactic (Christie 1977).15 Evidence of this more
inclusionary momentum is, for example, observable in the introduction
of victim impact statements under Section 5 of the Criminal Justice Act
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15 See also Lea (2002) who notes: ‘The result is that the relationship in which the victim
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of older social relations, predating those of crime control, in which crime was essentially a
relationship between victim and perpetrator … and in which the notion of the “social” as a
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1993, which provides that in determining sentences for sexual offences
or offences involving violence the court shall take into account and may,
where necessary, receive evidence or submission concerning any effect on
the victim. In addition allocution rights are provided to the victim under
Section 5(3) of the Act. It is also evident in the abolition of a mandatory
requirement on judges to warn juries of the dangers of convicting on the
basis of the uncorroborated testimony of children and sexual
complainants.16 Fortunately, the exclusionary notion that the testimony
of children is inherently unreliable, and the ‘folkloric assumption that
women are by nature peculiarly prone to malice and mendacity and
particularly adept at concealing it’ (Temkin 1982, p. 418), no longer 
hold sway. This more inclusionary momentum is also, inter alia, evident
in the employment of intermediaries, live television links and video
testimonies for witnesses and victims in the courtroom; separate legal
representation for rape victims under the Sex Offenders Act 2001;
provisions for greater victim participation in the restorative justice model
embodied under the Children Act 2001;17 and greater judicial awareness
of the reasons that might prevent a sexual complainant from making a
complaint at the first available opportunity.18
Conclusion
All of the five categories delineated above impact upon the equality of
arms framework created between the state and the accused throughout
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Much of the momentum for the
changes taking place is grounded in the need for greater public
protection and security. One current theme in particular, which
repeatedly resonates in many Western countries, is the extent to which
public protection and security should trump the individual liberty rights
of people such as those accused of crime.The needs of public protection
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and security, of course, are essential goods in society which are necessary
for our self-preservation, wellbeing and happiness. Criminal wrongdoing
impairs the ability of citizens to enjoy the fruits of fair justice and public
order. For these reasons alone, such criminal occurrences must be
considered in the context of security and the need to enable justice to
take place in an environment which is free from the threat of injury or
harm.The pursuit of public protection and security through our criminal
law system, therefore, is an objective that we should all support and we
should constantly seek ways of reforming the law so as to enhance such
goals.
But we should also bear in mind that the demand for security and
public protection must be ranged against the need to live in a society
which is genuinely committed to safeguarding civil liberties and human
rights. Individuals want to be able to go about their daily lives free from
the menace of crime. But they also want to live in a society where strong
due process safeguards exist which guarantee, as far as practicable,
fairness of outcome, should they themselves be accused or suspected of
a crime by the state. This is an important point because we sometimes
conveniently forget that those accused of crime and offenders are also
citizens and that their liberty interests are also our liberty interests.
Maintaining a balance between these often competing, though not
mutually exclusive, perspectives is a complex and tortuous process. By
keeping both perspectives in mind, we can better ensure that any
measures designed at enhancing security are driven by evidence-based
criteria and broader considerations of strategy implications rather than
broad-based appeals to common-sense authoritarianism and simple
majoritarianism.
Finally, it is also important to bear in mind, as we have seen above,
that not all of the momentum is authoritarian and repressive in
orientation.There is a tendency to view alterations in the equality of arms
framework simply in Manichean terms with the forces of light of the
equality of arms framework ranged against the forces of darkness of any
attempts to change it. As we have sought to show above, some of the
momentum underpinning changes in the equality of arms framework is
more inclusionary and complex in design than this Manichean vision
tends to portray. Attempting to include previously overlooked voices or
‘strengthening the criminalisation’ of previously overlooked crimes in the
employment, corporate and environmental arenas cannot simply be
explained in terms of a logic of repression.
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